Peaceful Assembly and Freedom of Association

Peaceful Assembly and Freedom of Association

Section 15 of the Human Rights Act 2004 says that:

  1. Everyone has the right of peaceful assembly.
  2. Everyone has the right to freedom of association.

Section 15 is based on articles 21 and 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a human rights treaty to which Australia is a party.

Scope of the rights

The right of peaceful assembly

The right of peaceful assembly entitles people to gather for specific purposes, including to exercise their right to freedom of expression by conveying and receiving information and ideas, and to protest. It covers non-violent gatherings of two or more people, in both public and private. Such gatherings may be outdoors, indoors, online, or a combination of these. Both stationary gatherings (where participants stay in one place) and mobile ones (such as processions and protest marches) are covered.

Other key points regarding the right of peaceful assembly include:

  • the right protects peaceful political assemblies such as demonstrations and protests, but is not limited to these. It also protects peaceful gatherings to assert or affirm group solidarity or identity, for example, to celebrate a national day. Gatherings can have more than one objective, including entertainment, cultural, religious or commercial objectives, and still be protected by this right;
  • the right does not mean assemblies can take place in any location whatsoever. For instance, people are not generally entitled to assemble on privately owned land if the owner has not granted permission. This is particularly the case if there were other available and appropriate areas for the assembly to take place;
  • the right does not prevent governmental authorities from requiring a group to apply for permission to conduct an assembly. However, any such requirement must be clearly necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose, such as to ensure the safety of participants and other people, and not disproportionately restrict the exercise of the right.

The right to freedom of association

The right to freedom of association entitles everyone to associate voluntarily with other people to pursue, promote or protect common interests – for instance, economic, professional, political, cultural or recreational interests. It entitles people both to form and to join associations. Clubs, political parties, non-governmental/civil society organisations and trade unions are all examples of associations. The right to form or join a trade union or other work-related organisation, specifically, is also protected by another section of the Human Rights Act, section 27B(3).

This right does not mean a person is automatically allowed to join any association. Associations are still generally free to set their own rules of membership, meaning they can choose who to admit (allow to join) or expel. However, depending on the nature of the association, an association may still have non-discrimination obligations under the Human Rights Act and/or related anti-discrimination laws. For more information on such obligations, see our factsheet on rights to recognition, equality and non-discrimination.

When could these rights be relevant?

The actions of government agencies and other public authorities can both promote and limit human rights. Among other examples, section 15 may be relevant to:

  • limiting the ability of a person or group of people to gather for a peaceful protest or for another specific purpose;
  • regulating membership of groups or organisations;
  • treating people differently on the basis of their membership of a group or organisation, for example, trade unions;
  • creating disincentives for membership in a group or organisation (including a disclosure requirement);
  • prohibiting membership in a group or organisation, for example a gang suspected to be involved in organised crime or a political group suspected of terrorism;
  • regulating or prohibiting association between people detained in prison facilities, or those people’s association with groups or organisations outside those facilities.

Cases

ACT

ACT decisions on the human rights set out in section 15 include Robb v Uren [2019] ACTSC 312 and Turner v Raiser[2021] ACTSC 21. Both of these concerned the right to freedom of association, under section 15(2), of people convicted of committing a crime who had ties to motorcycle gangs.

The ACT’s Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 allows a court to make a “non-association order” as one of the sentences for some crimes. Such an order prohibits the person convicted from being with people named in the order, communicating with them, or trying to do so.

In Robb v Uren, a magistrate had imposed a non-association order prohibiting Mr Robb from associating with other members of a motorcycle gang. However, the Supreme Court of the ACT decided that this order was invalid. Mr Robb’s conviction was for an assault, which he committed with one other person who was also a gang member, while out with family, not at an event related to the gang. The Court said that in light of the right to freedom of association, normally there must be a “demonstrable and substantial connection” between the crime for which a person is being sentenced and the making of, and terms of, any non-association order. In this case, the connection was only tenuous, so the order was unjustified.

In Turner v Raiser, an associate of the same gang had been convicted of two offences: affray, for his role in a fight at a bar involving gang members, and threatening to kill a police officer, later on, once he was in police custody. A magistrate imposed a non-association order on him for both offences. When he appealed this decision, the Supreme Court upheld the order for his affray offence, but not the threat to kill. Taking into account his right to freedom of association, the Court concluded, in effect, that the connection between that threat and his gang association was too remote to justify the order.

Other jurisdictions

The right of peaceful assembly and right to freedom of association have also been considered by courts, tribunals and other decision-making bodies in many jurisdictions besides the ACT.

Several recent decisions on the right of peaceful assembly have concerned restrictions imposed on gatherings during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Central Unitaria de Traballadores/as v Spain (Judgment of 17 October 2024), for example, the European Court of Human Rights considered a complaint about Spanish authorities’ refusal to allow a trade union to hold a convoy demonstration in May 2020, due to COVID-19 restrictions. The union had informed the authorities that demonstrators would participate in individual cars and take appropriate protective measures. Nonetheless, the Court decided that the Spanish authorities did not unlawfully restrict the right of peaceful assembly. The Court noted that their refusal to allow the demonstration took place in an “exceptional factual context”, namely the first few months of the pandemic, when knowledge of the level of risk posed by COVID-19 was still limited. In this context, the refusal was reasonable at the time, even if it might seem overly cautious in retrospect.

Another relevant decision, from Victoria, concerned how the right to freedom of association could be limited in an employee selection process. In this decision, Victorian Electoral Commission (Anti-Discrimination Exemption) [2009] VCAT 2191, Victoria’s Civil and Administrative Tribunal granted an exemption to the Victorian Electoral Commission from complying fully with Victorian equal opportunity legislation. This exemption enabled the Commission to take into account a person’s political activity, such as their membership of a political party, when considering whether to employ them.

The Tribunal accepted that this exemption would limit a number of human rights including the right to freedom of association. However, in its view, the exemption had a very important public purpose: to ensure that the Commission was, and was seen to be, independent and impartial in conducting elections. Taking this account, the Tribunal decided that the exemption was a reasonable limitation on these rights.

Note:

This factsheet is not intended to be a substitute for legal advice.

Last updated January 2026.